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We reassess the gains from monetary policy coordination within the conﬁnes of
the canonical NOEM in the light of three issues. First, the literature uses a number
of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium concepts that do not always clearly
distinguish commitment and discretionary outcomes, and in some cases adopts inap-
propriate concepts. Second, our analysis is welfare based. Moreover, as with much
of this literature, we adopt a linear-quadratic approximation of the actual non-linear
non-quadratic stochastic optimization problem facing the monetary policymakers. Our
second objective then is to re-assess welfare gains using an accurate approximation
for such a problem, a feature that for the most part is lacking in previous studies.
Finally, we examine the issue where the monetary authority is restricted to rules that
are operational in two senses: ﬁrst, the zero lower bound constraint is imposed on the
optimal rule and second, we study simple Taylor-type commitment rules that unlike
fully optimal rules are easily monitored by the public.
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Following the seminal contribution of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), chapter 10, New Keyne-
sian open economy DSGE modelling, the ’New Open Economy Macroeconomics’, has been
a highly active area.1 Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ developed a non-stochastic, perfect foresight
two-country general equilibrium model with ﬁrst ﬂexible prices, and then price-rigidity.
This model formed the basis for the emergence of a wave of New Open Economy stochas-
tic general equilibrium models that have been used to examine the potential welfare gains
from monetary policy coordination. The earlier of these studies were based on a very ba-
sic New Open Economy Model (NOEM) that assumed perfect ﬁnancial markets, complete
exchange rate pass-through, the absence of a traded sector, wage ﬂexibility and other
features that kept the analysis reasonably tractable (though ultimately the reliance on
numerical simulations to quantify the gains from cooperation still remained).2
The more recent papers have seen a reassessment of these gains using more empirical
and more developed DSGE models incorporating various persistence mechanisms, incom-
plete ﬁnancial markets, incomplete exchange rate pass-through and a non-traded sector.3In
the words of Canzoneri et al. (2005), “what is yet to come” is the reassessment of welfare
gains from coordination using empirical DSGE models that embody these features.
This paper does not attempt this ambitious goal. Our aim instead is to remain more
or less within the conﬁnes of the canonical NOEM and to examine the no gains result
in the light of three issues. First, the literature uses a number of cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibrium concepts that do not always clearly distinguish commitment and
discretionary outcomes, and in some cases adopts inappropriate concepts. Second, our
analysis is welfare based. Moreover, as with much of this literature, we adopt a linear-
quadratic approximation of the actual non-linear non-quadratic stochastic optimization
problem facing the monetary policymakers. Our second objective then is to re-assess
welfare gains using an accurate approximation for such a problem, a feature that for the
most part is lacking in previous studies. Finally, we examine the issue where the monetary
authority is restricted to rules that are operational in two senses: ﬁrst, the zero lower bound
1See also Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) and a survey by Lane (2001).
2See, for example, Benigno and Benigno (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) Clarida et al. (2002) and
Pappa (2004a).
3See, in particular, Sutherland (2004), Batini et al. (2005), Liu and Pappa (2005), Coenen et al. (2007).
1constraint is imposed on the optimal rule and second, we study simple Taylor-type rules
that unlike fully optimal rules are easily monitored by the public.
2 The Model
In this section set out a standard model, similar to Pappa (2004b).4 In her model there
is no non-traded sector, complete ﬁnancial markets, only PCP setting, ﬂexible wages, no
government spending, no habit, no indexation and only productivity shocks. Her model
allows for home bias and a non-unitary elasticity of substitution in the choice of domestic
and imported goods. We generalize to include external habit in consumption, government
spending, preference shocks, an oil shock and price indexing. Details of the model are as
follows.
2.1 Households
There are ν households in the ‘home’ bloc and ν∗ households in the ‘foreign’ bloc. A























where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t, β is the
household’s discount factor, UC,t, UM,t and UL,t are preference shocks Ct(r) is an index
of consumption, Lt(r) are hours worked, HC,t represents the habit in consumption, or




r=1 Ct(r) is the average consumption index, h ∈ [0,1). When h = 0, σ > 1 is the
risk aversion parameter (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution)5.
Mt(r) are end-of-period nominal money balances and Gt is exogenous per capita real
government spending assumed to be exclusively on non-traded domestic output. An anal-
ogous symmetric intertemporal utility is deﬁned for the ‘foreign’ representative household
and the corresponding variables (such as consumption) are denoted by C∗
t (r), etc.
4Clarida et al. (2002) is a special case of her model. At various places in the paper we indicate how
their model and results can be obtained.
5When h  = 0, σ is merely an index of the curvature of the utility function.
2The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
PtCt(r) + Et[Qt,t+1Dt+1(r)] + Mt(r) = (1 − Tt)Wt(r)Lt(r) + Dt(r) + Mt−1(r)
+ (1 − Tt)Γt(r) + TRt (2)
where Pt is a Dixit-Stiglitz CPI price index deﬁned in (4) below, Dt+1(r) is a random
variable denoting the payoﬀ of the portfolio purchased at time t and Qt,t+1, the stochastic
discount factor, is the period-t price of an asset that pays one unit of domestic currency in
a particular state of period t+1 divided by the probability of an occurrence of that state
given information available in period t. Wt(r) is the wage rate, Tt the income tax rate
and Γt(r) are dividends from ownership of ﬁrms.6 Finally TRt are lump-sum transfers to
households by the government net of lump-sum taxes
Assume the existence of nominal one-period riskless bonds denominated in domestic
currency with nominal interest rate It over the interval [t,t + 1]. Then arbitrage consid-
erations imply that Et[Qt,t+1] = 1
1+It. In addition, if we assume that households’ labour
supply is diﬀerentiated with elasticity of supply η, then (as we shall see below) the demand











r=1 Wt(r)1−η  1










are the average wage
index and average employment respectively.7
Let the number of diﬀerentiated goods produced in the home and foreign blocs be nH
and nF respectively. Each good is produced by a single ﬁrm and we assume that the the
ratio of households to ﬁrms are the same in each bloc, i.e., ν
n = ν∗
n∗. It follows that n and
n∗ (or ν and ν∗) are measures of size. Then the per capita consumption index in the home














;    = 1
= w−w(1 − w)−(1−w)CH,t(r)wCF,t(r)1−w ;   = 1 (4)
6The tax rate Tt can be interpreted as a total tax wedge (see Levine et al. (2006)).
7Note that if we normalize ν = 1 then as is more customary in the literature we can write Wt ≃




1−η . However here we allow for diﬀerent sized blocs with the foreign number of households
ν
∗  = ν.





























CH,t(f,r) and CF,t(f,r) denote the home consumption of traded variety f produced in
blocs H and F respectively, ζ is the elasticities of substitution between varieties in each




nHω + nF(1 − ω)
(7)
In (7) ω ∈ [1
2,1] is a parameter that captures the degree of ‘bias’ in the home bloc. If
ω = 1 we have autarky, while the lower extreme of ω = 1
2 gives us the case of no home bias
(perfect integration). If blocs are of equal size then nH = nF, w = ω and consumption only
favours home consumption if there is home bias.8 In the absence of home bias w = nH
nH+nF ,
w + w∗ = 1 and domestic/foreign consumption decisions depend only on relative size.
If PH,t(f), PF,t(f) are the prices in domestic currency of the good produced by ﬁrm
























where aggregate price indices for domestic and foreign consumption bundles of traded

























8The case µ → 1 without home bias is studied in Clarida et al. (2002). The eﬀect of home bias in open
economies is also examined in Corsetti et al. (2002) and De Fiore and Liu (2002).
4and the aggregate price indices Pt, P∗
t are given by
Pt = UOIL,t
 
w(PH,t)1−µ + (1 − w)(PF,t)1−µ  1
1−µ ;    = 1













;  ∗ = 1 (13)
where UOIL,t is an oil price shock. Aggregate nominal consumption is then given by
PtCt = PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t (14)
It now follows that relative CPI prices
StP ∗
t
Pt , the ‘real exchange rate’, and the terms
of trade, deﬁned as the domestic currency relative price of imports to exports, Tt =
PF,t
PH,t,








+ (1 − w∗)1−µ∗  1
1−µ∗
 





;    = 1, ∗  = 1
= T w+w∗−1
t ;   =  ∗ = 1, (15)
Thus if   =  ∗, then the law of one price applies to the CPI price indices iﬀ w∗ = 1 − w.




Pt , rises (a depreciation) as the terms of trade, T , rises (a depreciation).9
Now consider the consumption, money demand and labour supply decisions of the
representative household. We ﬁrst consider the case of ﬂexible wages. Then maximizing (1)
subject to (2) and (3), treating habit as exogenous, and imposing symmetry on households



































9Clarida et al. (2002) assumed no bias and µ = µ





t are the marginal utility of consumption, money holdings
and the marginal disutility of work respectively. Taking expectations of (16) we arrive at
the following familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule:










In (17), the demand for money balances depends positively on consumption relative to
habit and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Given the central bank’s setting of the
latter and ignoring seignorage in the government budget constraint, (17) is completely
recursive to the rest of the system describing our macro-model and will be ignored in the
rest of the paper. In (18) the real disposable wage is proportional to the marginal rate





, this constant of proportionality
reﬂecting the market power of households that arises from their monopolistic supply of a
diﬀerentiated factor input with elasticity η.
2.2 Producers
In the domestic sector, each good diﬀerentiated good f is produced by a single ﬁrm f











where Lt(f,r) is the labour input of type r by ﬁrm f and At is an exogenous shock captur-
ing shifts to trend total factor productivity in this sector. Minimizing costs
 ν
f=1 Wt(r)Lt(f,r)







and aggregating over ﬁrms leads to the demand for labor as shown in (3).10
In a equilibrium of equal households, all wages adjust to the same level Wt. For later
analysis it is useful to deﬁne the real marginal cost (MC) as the wage relative to domestic
10Note that in a symmetric equilibrium of identical ﬁrms and households, total demand for labour of
type r by ﬁrms is Lt(r) =
 nH




r=1 Lt(r), nHLt(f) = νLt(r). Such
a symmetric equilibrium applies to the ﬂexi-price case of our model, but not to the sticky-price case where,
at each point in time, some ﬁrms are locked into price and wage contracts, but others are re-optimizing
these contracts.






(η − 1)(1 − Tt)At
L
φ






Turning to price-setting we assume that there is a probability of 1−ξH at each period
that the price of each good f is set optimally to ˆ PH,t(f). If the price is not re-optimized,
then it is indexed to last period’s aggregate producer price inﬂation.11 With indexation
parameter γH ≥ 0, this implies that successive prices with no re-optimization are given by










,... . For each producer f the objective















where Qt,t+k is the discount factor over the interval [t,t + k], subject to a common12
downward sloping demand from domestic consumers and foreign importers of elasticity ζ




























+ (1 − ξH)( ˆ PH,t+1(f))1−ζ (25)
The ﬁrst-order condition (24) is cumbersome to manipulate. However it is possible
to express this price-setting rule in terms of diﬀerence equations that are far easier to







and multiplying both sides of (24) by (
ˆ PH,t
PH,t)ζMUC
t and in addition noting that PH,t+k/PH,t =
ΠH,t+k...ΠH,t+1, the ﬁrms’ staggered price setting can be succinctly described by
QH,t = Λt/Ht (27)
11Thus we can interpret
1
1−ξH as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
12Recall that we have imposed a symmetry condition ζ = ζ
∗ at this point; i.e., the elasticity of substi-
tution between diﬀerentiated goods produced in any one bloc is the same for consumers in both blocs.















Ht − ξβEt[˜ Π
ζ−1
H,t+1Ht+1] = Yt MUC
t (31)













and from (25) aggregate inﬂation is given by
1 = ξH ˜ Π
ζ−1
H,t + (1 − ξH)Q
1−ζ
H,t (33)
This completes the supply-side in the home bloc. Analogous results hold for the foreign
bloc.
2.3 Price Dispersion
The impact of price dispersion arises from labour input being the same for each individual,

























PH,t )−ζdj ≥ 1. Equality is reached only when
prices are ﬂexible and therefore the same, as all ﬁrms are identical except in their timing





which clearly highlights the output distortion caused by price dispersion ∆t ≥ 1.
Price dispersion is linked to inﬂation as follows. Assuming as before that the number
of ﬁrms is large we obtain the following dynamic relationship:
∆t = ξ˜ Π
ζ




In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating








H,t + Gt (37)
(38)
Fiscal policy is rudimentary: a balanced government budget constraint13





H,t + PH,tGt) ≡ Tt GDPt (39)
where GDPt is nominal GDP, completes the model. As in Coenen et al. (2005) we further
assume that changes in government spending are ﬁnanced exclusively by changes in lump-
sum taxes with the tax rates Tt, held constant at its steady-state value.


























. Then assuming identical holdings of initial wealth in the two blocs,
(40) implies that zt+1 = zt = z0 where initial relative consumption in prices denominated













Given nominal interest rates It,I∗
t the money supply is ﬁxed by the central banks to
accommodate money demand. By Walras’ Law we can dispense with the bond market
equilibrium condition. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned at t = 0 as stochastic sequences
Ct, CH,t, CF,t, PH,t, PF,t, Pt, Mt, Wt, YH,t, Lt, , Lt, ˆ PH,t, 16 foreign counterparts C∗
t , etc,
RERt, and Tt, given past price indices and exogenous processes UC,t, UM,t, UL,t, At, TRt,
Gt and foreign counterparts.
13In this cashless economy, we ignore seignorage and consistent with this we later ignore the utility from
money balances in the household welfare function.
14(41) is the risk-sharing condition for consumption, because it equates marginal rate of substitution
to relative price, as would be obtained if utility were being jointly maximized by a social planner (see
Sutherland (2002)). Note that (79) and (41) together imply the stochastic UIP condition (see Benigno and
Benigno (2001)).
92.5 Steady State
A deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state, denoted by variables without the time sub-





















1−µ ;    = 1
= Pw
H P1−w








1 = β(1 + I) (46)
∆ = 1 (47)
Y = AL (48)
































+ 1 − w∗  1
1−µ∗
[w + (1 − w)T 1−µ]
1
1−µ
;    = 1, ∗  = 1










We now have gives 25 equations to determine the steady state of 27 endogenous vari-
ables: C, CH, CF, P, W, L, I, ∆, Y , PH = ˆ PH, PF, T, 12 foreign counterparts C∗ etc,
T , S, and RER given G, TR and z0.
10To pin down price levels we need to re-introduce money equate money demand and
its foreign counterpart with exogenously set money supplies in the two blocs, which then
gives us a determinate steady state of the model. It is convenient to assume that money
supplies in our steady state are set so as to result in S = 1 and dispense with the money
demand equations. Furthermore, as is standard in general equilibrium models, we choose
units of output appropriately so that steady-state prices of the two goods in their own
currencies are unity; i.e, PH = P∗
F = 1. With this normalization and the fact that the law
of one price holds in the steady state, we have that P = PF = T = RER = 1. Similarly
for the foreign bloc P∗ = P∗
H = 1. Thus in the steady state we can normalize all prices at
unity, an extremely convenient property when it comes to the linearization.
2.5.1 The Ineﬃciency of the Steady State
In our model there are three sources of ineﬃciency: the tax wedge, labour and output
market power, and external habit. Later in the LQ approximation of the policymakers’
optimization problems these ineﬃciencies in the steady state play a prominent role. In a
symmetric model of two identical economies the steady state trade balance is zero and we
can appeal to results from Choudhary and Levine (2006). Then the zero-inﬂation steady
state output in the market economy above and the steady state of the social optimum are
given respectively by
Y φ+σ =
A1+φ(1 − T)(1 − 1
ζ)(1 − 1
η)
κ(1 − h)σ(1 − gy)σ (56)
ˆ Y φ+σ =
A1+φ(1 − βh)
κ(1 − h)σ(1 − gy)σ (57)

















≥ or ≤ 0 (58)
In the case where there is no habit persistence (h = 0), then Φy > 0. Then tax distortions
and market power in the output and labour markets, captured by the elasticities η ∈ (0,∞)
and ζ ∈ (0,∞) respectively, drive the market equilibrium output below the eﬃcient level.
If h = T = 0 and η = ζ = ∞, tax distortions and market power both disappear, Φy = 0 and
the steady state market equilibrium is eﬃcient. But if h > 0, this leads to the possibility
that Φy < 0 and then the market equilibrium output is actually above the eﬃcient level
11(see Choudhary and Levine (2006)). Then the household’s consumption-leisure choose
leads to excessive levels of work eﬀort and consumption and insuﬃcient leisure relative to
the social optimum.
2.6 Linearized Model
Linearizing about the steady state set out in section 2.5 we obtain the following state-space
representation. All variables are expressed in deviation form15
























oilt+1 = ρooilt + ǫo,t+1
EtmuC
t+1 = muC
t − (it − Etπt+1)
EtmuC ∗


















t − muC ∗
t






where X is the baseline steady state. For
variables expressing a rate of change over time, πt and it, xt = Xt − X. Since steady-state inﬂation is






a log-linearization leads to
practically the same linear form of the dynamic model, but, as we will see, to quite diﬀerent quadratic
approximations of the loss function.
12πH,t, π∗
F,t producer price inﬂation over interval [t − 1,t]
πF,t, π∗
H,t imported price inﬂation over interval [t − 1,t]
πt, π∗
t CPI inﬂation over interval [t − 1,t]
it, i∗




t , muC ∗
t marginal utility of consumption
muL
t , muL∗








t total factor productivity shock
gt, g∗







rert real exchange rate




h, h∗ habit parameters
λH =
(1−βξH)(1−ξH)







F Phillips Curve Parameter in F Country
1 − ξH, 1 − ξ∗
F probability of a price re-optimization
σ, σ∗ risk-aversion parameter
φ, φ∗ disutility of labour supply parameter
w − 1
2, w∗ − 1
2 degree of home bias































cH,t = ct −  (pH,t − pt) = ct +  (1 − w)τt
c∗
H,t = c∗
t −  ∗(p∗
H,t − p∗
t) = c∗
t + w∗ ∗τt
cF,t = ct −  (pF,t − pt) = ct −  wτt
c∗
F,t = c∗
t −  ∗(p∗
F,t − p∗
t) = c∗
t −  ∗(1 − w∗)τt
yt = αHcH,t + αFc∗














πt ≡ pt − pt−1 = wπH,t + (1 − w)πF,t + oilt
π∗
t = w∗π∗





H,t−1 = πH,t + π∗
t − πt − ∆rert
πF,t ≡ pF,t − pF,t−1 = ∆rert + πt − π∗
t + π∗
F,t
Etπt+1 = wEtπH,t+1 + (1 − w)EtπF,t+1 + ρooilt
Etπ∗
t+1 = w∗Etπ∗
F,t+1 + (1 − w∗)Etπ∗
H,t+1 + ρooilt
Etπ∗
H,t+1 = EtπH,t+1 + Etπ∗
t+1 − Etπt+1 − (Etrert+1 − rert)
EtπF,t+1 = Etrert+1 − rert + Etπt+1 − Etπ∗
t+1 + Etπ∗
F,t+1
Etrert+1 = EtmuC ∗
t+1 − EtmuC
t+1
rert = muC ∗
t − muC
t
(w∗ + w − 1)τt = rert
14The ﬂexi-price zero expected inﬂation economy and output gap are given by
Et  mu
C
t+1 =   mu
C
t − ˆ rt ( determines ˆ rt)
Et  mu
C ∗
t+1 =   mu
C ∗
t −   r∗
t ( determines ˆ r∗
t)
  mct = 0 =   wrt − at − (1 − w)ˆ τt ( determines   wrt)
  mc
∗
t = 0 =   wr
∗
t − a∗
t + (1 − w∗)ˆ τt ( determines   wr
∗
t)
  mrst =   wrt =   mu
L
t −   mu
C





t =   wr
∗
t =   mu
L∗
t −   mu
C ∗





ˆ ct = −  mu
C

















t = φˆ lt + uL,t + uC,t
  mu
L∗




  rert =   mu
C ∗
t −   mu
C
t
ˆ lt = ˆ yt − at
ˆ l∗
t = ˆ y∗
t − a∗
t
ˆ yt = αHˆ ct + αFˆ c∗





Hˆ ct − [α∗
F ∗(1 − w∗) + α∗
H w]ˆ τt
(w∗ + w − 1)ˆ τt =   rert
ogapt = ˆ yt − yt
ogap∗
t = ˆ y∗
t − y∗
t























where zt = [shocks at,a∗
t etc,πH,t−1, π∗
F,t−1] is a vector of predetermined variables and
xt = [muC
t ,muC ∗
t ,πH,t,πF,t] is a vector of non-predetermined or ‘jump’ variables.
153 Equilibrium Concepts
3.1 Cooperation, Non-Cooperation, Commitment and Discretion
Optimal policy can be formulated independently by each monetary authority. However In
addition to the time-inconsistency problem there is a second classical problem ﬁrst raised
by Hamada (1976): in an open economy, rules designed for the single economy may perform
badly in a world Nash equilibrium when all countries pursue similar optimal policies. In
the open economy the optimal monetary policy requires all policymakers to cooperate,
maximizing an agreed global welfare, and to be able to commit not just with respect to
each other but collectively with respect to the private sector too. These considerations
lead to a number of possible equilibria depending on whether policymakers cooperate and
can commit to the private sector and whether they can commit with respect to each other
(i.e., can cooperate).
Consider symmetrical equilibria in the sense that all authorities can either commit or
not with respect to the private sector. In the absence of any commitment mechanism for
players all authorities must independently pursue discretionary policies (non-cooperation
with discretion (ND)). If authorities can cooperate (i.e., can commit to each other) and can
commit with respect to the private sector, then the socially optimal policy with respect
to an agreed global objective function can be achieved (cooperation with commitment
to the private sector, CC). The remaining possible equilibria are those where (for some
reason) authorities can commit to each other but not to the private sector (cooperation
with discretion, CD) or vice versa, they can commit to the private sector but not to each





Table 2. Possible Equilibria
For linear-quadratic dynamic games, these equilibria are formulated in Levine and Cur-
rie (1987a), Levine and Currie (1987b), Currie and Levine (1993), Currie et al. (1996)) and
summarized in Appendix A. General procedures, not speciﬁc to any one model, for their
16calculation and software for their computation have been developed (see Kemball-Cook
et al. (1995).) In a two-bloc model the potential gains from commitment in the absence of
coordination can be quantiﬁed by comparing the welfare in equilibria NC and ND. These
‘gains’ can be negative: as in Levine and Currie (1987b), for an ad hoc ‘Old Keynesian’
model commitment without coordination may be counterproductive. Similarly one can as-
sess the potential gains from coordination in the absence of commitment by comparing
equilibria CD and ND and revisit the possibility of counterproductive cooperation found
by Rogoﬀ (1985).
To realize the full potential gain from monetary policy coordination between the two
blocs requires a combination of commitment and coordination; i.e., equilibrium CC and
this can be be quantiﬁed by comparing CC with the non-cooperative alternatives, NC or
ND. The ﬁrst wave of the new Keynesian open economy models that revisited this old
issue in the literature cited above suggested that these gains are not substantial compare
with the gains from stabilization. Referring to table 6, Clarida et al. (2002) compare CD
and ND and show there exists gains from CC if and only if σ  = 1. Pappa (2004a) and
Benigno and Benigno (2001) compare CC and NC. Pappa (2004a) shows gains are small
and Benigno and Benigno (2001) show that CC can be sustained as an NC equilibrium by
delegation to a central bank with an appropriate loss function. Finally Currie and Levine
(1993) compare CC and ND, but using an ad hoc model and utility function.
3.2 Welfare-Based Versus Real World Equilibria
In most of the recent literature the policymaker pursues the welfare-based objective based
on the underlying utility function of the household. Then the gains from coordination are
calculated as the increase in welfare. However Svensson (2003) proposes a totally diﬀerent










for the home bloc, where ot = yt − ˆ yt is the output gap.
17What we observe is not (61) but reaction functions of various possible forms:
it = ρit−1 + θππH,t + θyogapt (62)
it = ρit−1 + θππH,t + θyyt (63)
it = ρit−1 + θππH,t + θy∆yt (64)
Then armed with estimates ρ, θπ and θy we can reverse-engineer the implied coeﬃcients wπ
and wi from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in such rules. This is computationally
expensive but possible, at least for the simple model in this section. Having obtained wπ
and wi the corresponding cooperative equilibrium can be calculate. Finally the welfare
gains can be evaluated using the welfare-based utility function.
4 LQ Approximation
This section sets out the two forms of linear-quadratic approximation of the non-linear
stochastic optimization problems that characterize the welfare-based equilibria concepts
set out in the previous section. We distinguish between an equilibrium of social planners
and Ramsey planners.
4.1 Social Planners
Without cooperation the home policymaker be her a social or Ramsey planners at time
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(67)
18Since staggered price-setting is absent, ∆t = 1 and these are the only constraints facing the
home social planner. In a non-cooperative social planner’s equilibrium, given the foreign
social planner’s allocation C∗
t , L∗
t, the terms of trade are pinned down by the risk-sharing
condition leaving the home planner able to choose Ct, Lt to maximize (65) subject to the
resource constraint (66). For the foreign bloc we deﬁne an analogue of (65) denoted by
Ω∗










































(   = 1, ∗  = 1) (68)
with ∆∗
t = 1.
In the cooperative social planners equilibrium the two policymakers jointly maximize
some agreed linear combination αΩ0 + (1 − α)Ω∗
0, α ∈ [0,1], with respect to Ct, Lt and
C∗
t , L∗
t subject to (66), (68) and (67).
We restrict our results to the case of a symmetric equilibrium of identical economies
with a unitary elasticity   =  ∗ = 1. Then for the non-cooperative and cooperative steady
states we have, respectively
(ˆ Y NC)φ+σ =
A1+φ(1 − βh)w
 
2(1 − w)(1 − βh) + 2w−1
σ (1 − h)
 
κ(1 − h)σ(1 − gy)σ
 
4w(1 − w)(1 − βh) +
(2w−1)2
σ (1 − h)
  (69)
(ˆ Y C)φ+σ =
A1+φ(1 − βh)
κ(1 − h)σ(1 − gy)σ (70)
For later use we require the Taylor series second-order expansions, about these two steady
states, of the single-period loss functions, Wt and W∗
t in the non-cooperative equilibrium,
and WC
t ≡ Wt + W∗
t for the symmetric cooperative equilibrium. These are given respec-
19tively by
ˆ WNC
t = wc(ct − hct−1)2 + wyy2
t + wyaytat + wNC
τ τ2
t + wNC
cτ ctτt + wNC
hτ (ct − hct−1)τt
+ wNC
gτ τtgt + wNC
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oc oiltct + wNC
ya ytat
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oy oiltyt + wNC
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+ (t.i.p)NC + third order terms (71)
ˆ WC























+ (t.i.p)C + third order terms (72)
where weights wy etc are derived in Appendix B. Note that cooperative quadratic form is
not a simple sum of the non-cooperative forms; in particular the contribution of the terms
of trade and shock processes are diﬀerent in these two cases.
4.2 Ramsey Planners
Ramsey planners in both non-cooperative and cooperative games have the same objectives
as their social planing counterpart, but without the ability to plan consumption and labour
supply paths. Instead they face a decentralized economy given by resource constraints,
the market-sharing condition plus the price-setting behaviour of ﬁrms and the households’
Euler equations. Gathering up previous results the former, for the home bloc, are given
by
QH,t = Λt/Ht (73)































1 = ξH ˜ Π
ζ−1
H,t + (1 − ξH)Q
1−ζ
H,t (78)
20and the Euler equation is








Analogous results apply to the foreign bloc.
Much of the literature (for example, Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa (2004a)) now assumes
that the Ramsey planners can use tax instruments Tt and T∗
t to bring the zero-inﬂation
steady state of the decentralized economies in line with the social optima. For the non-
cooperative and cooperative games this require respectively, tax wedges
TNC = 1 −
(1 − hβ)w
 
2(1 − w)(1 − βh) + 2w−1
σ (1 − h)
 
4w(1 − w)(1 − βh) +
(2w−1)2

















Then Φy = 0 and the zero-inﬂations, zero-trade-balance steady state of section 2.6 is
eﬃcient. Note ﬁrst, that TNC > TC: in a Nash equilibrium of social planners, the
incentive to improve the terms of trade by restricting output leads each planner to choose
a higher distortionary tax wedge. Second, as w increases from w = 1
2, for the case of
no bias, to w = 1 for two closed economies then TNC falls from TNC = 1
2(1 + TC) to
TNC = TC.
We have calibrated our symmetric two-bloc model to US data and in particular chosen
15% and 20% mark-ups in the product and labour markets respectively. This gives ζ =
7.674 and η = 5. With the habit and discount factor calibrated at h = 0.5 and β = 0.99
(both on a quarterly basis), it follows that the optimal cooperative tax wedge is TC =
0.274 and the non-cooperative rate can be as high as TNC = 0.637. We have chosen the
calibrated value w = 0.75 for which TNC = 0.533. Interestingly, these tax rates compares
with a total tax wedge (consisting of taxes on consumption and income plus social security
contribution) of T = 0.373 for the US and T = 0.641 for the euro area, reported in Coenen
et al. (2007).
The nature of the game is a two-stage process which we refer to as the two-stage
Ramsey game. At stage 1 tax wedges are chosen so as to bring the steady state of the
decentralized economy in line with the socially optimal allocation. In a non-cooperative
game, each social planner’s choice of consumption and leisure is a best response to the
choice of the other; i.e., a Nash equilibrium in the individual blocs’ social optima. In the
21quadratic approximation (71), terms independent of policy (t.i.p), involve outcomes in the
other bloc and are t.i.p only for this particular game.
In the second stage the monetary instruments are used to achieve, as far as possible,
the outcome of the ﬁrst stage, but now there is staggered price-setting, inﬂation and costs
of inﬂation from price dispersion. From Appendix B, the Ramsey loss functions can now
be shown to take the approximate quadratic form
WNC
t = ˆ Wt + wπ(πH,t − γHπH,t−1)2 (82)
(W∗
t )NC = ( ˆ W∗
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where wπ and w∗
π are deﬁned in that Appendix.
The Nash equilibrium at this stage depends on the monetary instrument; these could
be inﬂation targets with nominal interest rates subsequently chosen to exactly achieve
these targets; or they can be the nominal interest rates themselves. The Nash equilibria
in nominal interest rates can be open-loop with the authorities responding to each other’s
interest rate paths. More appropriate in a stochastic environment with commitment are
closed-loop Nash equilibria with each authority choosing their best response to each other’s
feedback commitment rule.
Since we are interested in the gains from monetary policy coordination with indepen-
dent central banks we need to consider the Ramsey planner as a monetary authority with
only monetary but not ﬁscal instruments available. We refer to this as a single-stage
Ramsey game. Then tax wedges are given in the monetary policy game. Under what cir-
cumstances are the quadratic approximations (82) and (84) then appropriate for Ramsey
games? If the ﬁscal authorities have set their tax wedges close to TNC then (82) is a
good ‘small distortions’ approximation. But then the tax wedge is far higher than that
for cooperation and (84) is not a good ‘small distortions’ approximation for that game.
A similar argument holds if the ﬁscal authorities have set their tax wedges close to TC.
In short, (82) and (84) cannot both be good ‘small distortions’ approximations if the tax
wedge is given to the monetary authority.
Given the game we are interested in we now consider two Ramsey planners choosing
monetary instruments to maximize household welfare in an environment consisting of a
decentralized economy with possibly large distortions in the zero-inﬂation steady state..
22We show in Levine et al. (2007), the procedure for achieving an accurate LQ approximation
for each equilibrium concept is as follows16:
1. Deﬁne the optimization problem for the Ramsey planner. For the cooperative this is
a standard problem. For non-cooperative games we need to deﬁne the appropriate
equilibrium concept. Our ultimate aim is to obtain an accurate quadratic approx-
imation of welfare for the state-space representation of the game, (59) and (60).
Since interest-rates are given in this representation, we choose an open-loop Nash
equilibrium in interest rate paths.
2. Set out the deterministic non-linear form of each Ramsey problem, to maximize the
representative agents utility subject to non-linear dynamic constraints.
3. Write down the single Lagrangian for the cooperative problem, and the Lagrangians
for the two blocs for the non-cooperative problem. Associated with each Lagrangian
is a Hamiltonian consisting of the utility and a sum of all appropriately expressed
constraints for the decentralized economy time multipliers.
4. Calculate the ﬁrst order conditions. We do not require the initial conditions for
an optimum since we ultimately only need the steady-state about which we are
approximating.
5. Calculate the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions. The terminal condition
implied by this procedure is that the system converges to this steady state.
6. Calculate a second-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
Hamiltonian associated with the Lagrangian or Lagrangians in 2.
7. Calculate a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
ﬁrst-order conditions and the original constraints.
8. Use 4. to eliminate the steady-state Lagrangian multipliers in 5. By appropriate
elimination both the Hamiltonian and the constraints can be expressed in minimal
form.
16MATLAB software to implement this procedure is in preparation and will be available on request from
the authors.
23This then gives us the accurate LQ approximation of the original non-linear optimization
problem in the form of a minimal linear state-space representation of the constraints and
a quadratic form of the utility expressed in terms of the states. The quadratic form of
the utility function obtained for the cooperative Ramsey planners is then appropriate for
games CC and CD irrespective of the monetary instrument; that obtained for the non-
cooperative Ramsey planners is appropriate for games NC and ND, but only where interest
rates are the instruments.
We have now set out two quite distinct procedures for obtaining a LQ state-space rep-
resentation for diﬀerent equilibria. In the two-stage Ramsey games the planner has access
to a ﬁscal instrument and uses monetary policy to minimize a quadratic approximation of
the loss function that the social planner would choose. In the single-stage Ramsey game
the monetary authority must deal with an economy that is distorted in the steady state
and minimizes a quadratic approximation of loss function appropriate for decentralized
economy with the nominal interest rate as the instrument. It should be emphazized that
these lead to quite diﬀerent non-cooperative equilibria concepts even in the case where all
labour market, output market, external habit and distortionary taxes disappear.
5 The Zero Lower Bound Constraint
We can impose an interest rate ZLB in a straightforward way by modifying the LQ opti-
mization problemsi. As in Woodford (2003), chapter 6, this is implemented by modifying










with an analogous adjustment for the foreign bloc. As explained in Levine et al. (2006), the
policymaker’s optimization problem is to choose an unconditional distribution for it (i.e.,
the steady-state variance) shifted to the right about a new non-zero steady-state inﬂation
rate and a higher nominal interest rate, such that the probability, p, of the interest rate
hitting the lower bound is very low. This is implemented by calibrating the weight wi for
each of our policy rules so that z0(p)σi < R where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard
normally distributed variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p, R = 1
β −1+ ¯ π is the steady-
state nominal interest rate, σi is the unconditional variance and ¯ π is the new steady-state
24inﬂation rate. Given σi the steady-state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure it ≥ 0 with
probability 1 − p is given by







6 Gains from Coordination and Commitment
We now turn to numerical results. We assume symmetrical blocs with the calibration set
out in Appendix C. Only two-stage Ramsey games, with tax wedges chosen to eliminate
the distortions in the zero-inﬂation steady state, are considered.
6.1 Results with no ZLB Constraint
First let us ignore the ZLB constraint. Table 3 presents results for this case. The simple
commitment rules feed back on current domestic (GDP price deﬂator) inﬂation in each
bloc and take the form
it = ρit−1 + θππH,t (87)
i∗
t = ρ∗it−1 + θ∗
ππ∗
F,t (88)
SIMCC is the coordinated rule whilst SIMNC is chosen in a Nash game between the
countries. ce is the percentage consumption permanent equivalent gain from CC compared
with each alternative given by ce =
Ω0−ΩCC
0
(1−h) ×10−2. var(it) is the steady-state conditional
variance of the nominal interest rate. The welfare loss functions are given by (82)-(84) for
the non-cooperative and cooperative games with additional terms penalizing interest rate
variabilities, as in (85). In these simulations we have set the penalty on the interest rate
variability at wi = 1.5.17 Figure 1 compares the impulse responses for the regimes CC,
CD, ND and SIMCC following a 1% negative shock to the productivity parameter At at
t = 0.
17For wi < 1.5 we found that our iterative procedure for the non-cooperative equilibrium with discretion,
NCD, did not converge.
25Regime Rule Ω0 ce(%) var(it) ¯ π prob ZLB
CC complex 11.20 0 1.54 0 0.21
CD not applicable 17.16 0.12 5.00 0 0.33
ND not applicable 16.62 0.11 5.60 0 0.34
SIMCC (ρ,θπ) = (1.00,3.32) 11.64 0.008 1.87 0 0.23
SIMNC (ρ,θπ) = (1.00,4.17) 11.71 0.010 2.19 0 0.25
Table 3. Gains from Coordination and Commitment: no ZLB Constraint.18
A number of features stand out from these results. First, comparing the cooperative
regime with commitment, CC, with the cooperative regime with discretion we see there
are small, but not insigniﬁcant gains from commitment of 0.1% permanent increase in
consumption about the steady state. But comparing cooperation and non-cooperation
under discretion the gains are actually negative (but very small); i.e., ND dominates CD
or, in other words, cooperation without commitment can be counterproductive. This result
was ﬁrst found by Rogoﬀ (1985), but here the cooperative loss arises purely from the
stabilization problem.
Comparing the optimized Taylor rule under cooperative and non-cooperation, SIMCC
and SIMNC, we see the gains are very small, of the order of 0.002% permanent increase
in consumption.. However the conclusion that cooperative brings small beneﬁts needs to
be qualiﬁed by a consideration of the steady state variances. These are all high especially
with the discretionary regimes CD and ND with a high probability of hitting the ZLB on
the interest rate. This indicates that the rules we have designed are not operational. The
next subsection addresses this shortcoming.
6.2 Imposing the ZLB Constraint
In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss
at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
By increasing wi we can lower σi thereby decreasing ¯ π, given by (86), and reducing the
18In order to compare cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes, although the latter equilibria are
calculated using the single-period loss function W
NC
t , given by (82), the value for the expected welfare per
country, Ω0, reported in the table then uses W
C
t in (84).
26deterministic component. But this welfare improvement in the deterministic component
of the welfare loss comes about at the expense of increasing the stochastic component. By
exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we then arrive at the optimal policy that, in the vicinity of the
steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, it ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p.
Table 4 shows the results of this optimization procedure under commitment using the
loss functions given by (82)-(84). We choose p = 0.025. Given wi, denote the expected
inter-temporal loss (stochastic plus deterministic components) at time t = 0 by Ω0(wi).
This includes a term penalizing the variance of the interest rate which does not contribute
to utility loss as such, but rather represents the interest rate lower bound constraint.
Actual utility, found by subtracting the interest rate term, is given by Ω0(0). The steady
state inﬂation rate, ¯ π, that will ensure the lower bound is reached only with probability
p = 0.025 is computed using (86). Given ¯ π, we can then evaluate the deterministic
component of the welfare loss, ¯ Ω0. Since in the new steady state the real interest rate is
unchanged, the steady state involving real variables is also unchanged, so from (82)-(84)
we can write19
¯ Ω0(0) = wπ(1 − γH)2¯ π2 (89)
for the home bloc with an analogous result for the foreign bloc.
From the table we see that the optimal way of imposing the ZLB constraint is to
shift the distribution to the right by choosing a small steady state inﬂation rate in both
countries of 0.10% per quarter and to reduce the variance of the nominal interest rate to
σ2
i = σ∗2
i = 0.30 by choosing a weight wi = w∗
i. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this optimization
procedure.
19Both the ex-ante optimal and the optimal time-consistent deterministic welfare loss that guide the
economy from a zero-inﬂation steady state to π = ¯ π diﬀer from ¯ Ω0(0) (but not by much because the
steady state contribution by far outweighs the transitional contribution).
27wi var(it) ˜ Ω0(wi) ˜ Ω0(0) ¯ π ¯ Ω0(0) Ω0(0)
1 1.77 10.82 9.94 1.60 57.67 67.61
5 0.85 13.17 11.07 0.80 14.37 25.44
10 0.51 14.79 12.25 0.40 3.59 15.84
15 0.36 15.85 13.19 0.17 0.64 13.83
16 0.34 16.02 13.36 0.13 0.39 13.75
17 0.32 16.18 13.52 0.10 0.22 13.74
18 0.30 16.33 13.67 0.04 0.10 13.77
20 0.27 16.61 13.96 0.01 0.00 13.96
Table 4. Optimal Commitment with a Nominal Interest Rate ZLB.
6.2.1 Cooperation with Discretion (CD)
Turning to the regime cooperation with discretion (CD) we follow the same procedure as
for CC to arrive at the optimal choice of σ2
i = σ∗2
i = 0.30 and wi = w∗
i that achieves
the ZLB constraint. Figures 4 and 5 show the result. As before, to achieve the ZLB
constraint requires a non-zero steady state inﬂation, but now under discretion it is far
higher than under commitment. Whereas under commitment the trade-oﬀ between a
high steady-state inﬂation rate and a smaller stochastic welfare loss can be exploited to
drastically reduce the ultimate loss, this is not the case under discretion and highlights an
important diﬀerence between stabilization policy under commitment and discretion. For
the latter we see that the steady-state inﬂation – stochastic welfare loss trade-oﬀ is far
less favourable. As the weight on interest rate variability increases beyond wi = w∗
i = 9,
both the unconditional variance of the interest rate, and the steady-state inﬂation rate
needed to reduce the probability of hitting the ZLB to p = 0.025 increase. Now the
optimal choice of the weight is wi = w∗
i = 7 with a optimal steady state inﬂation rate at
¯ π = 2.76%. This is a somewhat counterintuitive result that can be explained in general by
the fact that under discretion, a policymaker lacks the leverage to manage the economy
she would enjoy under commitment. More speciﬁcally, the constraint on using the interest
rate, captured by increasing the weight wi beyond a certain point, simply results in a more
volatile economy including interest rate volatility.
286.2.2 Non-Cooperation with Discretion
Turning to non-cooperation with discretion, the home country policymaker now chooses a
weight wi and a steady-state inﬂation rate ¯ π to achieve its ZLB constraint. In a Nash game
the corresponding choice of w∗
i and ¯ π by the foreign policymaker is taken as given. This
leads to a reaction function in (wi,w∗
i) space shown in ﬁgure 6. If policymakers were to
cooperate just in the choice of (wi,w∗
i) it turns out that they would choose wi = w∗
i = 8.1
and achieve welfare outcomes in the subsequent non-cooperative and discretionary setting
of interest rates of Ω0 = Ω∗
0 = 207.75. However in the full non-cooperative game each
policymaker would try for rules that are more aggressive than the other with a lower
weight on interest rate variability. The intention given the setting of the other country
is to manipulate the exchange rate in the face of shocks. However, this is a beggar-thy-
neighbour strategy and in equilibrium each ends up with a sub-optimally low choice of
the weights at the intersection of the reaction functions at wi = w∗
i = 7.6 with Ω0 = Ω∗
0 =
208.29. At this equilibrium ¯ π = ¯ π∗ = 2.82 and σ2
i = σ∗2
i = 3.82. The outcomes under the
three regimes CC, CD and ND are summarized below in table 5. With the ZLB constraint
imposed we now observe that with discretion there are small but not insigniﬁcant gains
from cooperation of ce = 0.06%, compared with counter-productive coordination found
previously.
6.2.3 Current Inﬂation Commitment Rules
The results for the current inﬂation commitment rule wirh commitment (SIMCC) are
shown in ﬁgures 7 and 8 and summarized in the table below. The main feature is that
with the ZLB constraint, the costs of simplicity rise substantially from ce = 0.008% to
ce = 0.07%. The optimal choice of weight is wi = w∗
i = 29 with a steady state inﬂation
rate ¯ π = 0.20%. For SIMNC the interest rate variance rises a little with a corresponding
increase in the steady state inﬂation rate to ¯ π = 0.27%. Gains from cooperation with
current inﬂation commitment rules rise from ce = 0.002% without a ZLB to ce = 0.005%
with a ZLB, a more than doubling of a rather small eﬀect.
29Regime Rule Ω0 ce(%) var(it) ¯ π(%) prob ZLB
CC complex 13.74 0 0.32 0.10 0.025
CD not applicable 205.47 3.83 3.75 2.76 0.025
ND not applicable 208.29 3.89 3.82 2.82 0.025
SIMCC (ρ,θπ) = (1.000,0.574) 17.11 0.0674 0.382 0.20 0.025
SIMNC (ρ,θπ) = (1.000,0.622) 17.35 0.0722 0.418 0.27 0.025
Table 5. Gains from Coordination and Commitment with a ZLB Constraint.
6.2.4 Summary
The results of all ﬁve regimes with a ZLB are summarized in table 5 which should be
compared with table 3 without a zero lower bound. The main result that emerges is
that gains from commitment and cooperation rise substantially with ZLB considerations,
though the cooperative gains with commitment rules are still small. The cost of simplicity
in pursuing a simple current inﬂation rule, rather than its fully optimal counterpart also
rise substantially with a ZLB constraint imposed, but the gains still remain. Gains from
cooperation where policymakers cannot commit to the private sector are signiﬁcant with
ZLB considerations.
7 Conclusions
The main conclusion from our numerical results is that studies that concludes gains from
monetary policy coordination, but ignore the ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates,
may be misleading. We have shown that with ZLB considerations cooperative gains in-
crease substantially, and in discretionary equilibria the gain is signiﬁcant.
This result was obtained using a rudimentary New Keynesian model with a unitary
elasticity of substitution between home and imported goods, complete ﬁnancial markets,
complete exchange rate pass-through and no non-traded sector. Relaxing these assump-
tions is known to increase gains from monetary policy. Future research will pursue this
path in a two-bloc model estimate by Bayesian methods. We also intend to examine the
case of large distortions in one-stage Ramsey games, examine the policy regime NC and
pursue the implications of ‘real world equilibria’.
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A The Policy Rules
Consider ﬁrst the deterministic problem. Substituting out for outputs, the state-space











where zt is an (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables including non-stationary
processes, z0 is given, wt = [it,i∗
t]T is a vector of policy variables, xt is an m×1 vector of
non-predetermined variables and xe
t+1,t denotes rational (model consistent) expectations
of xt+1 formed at time t. Then xe
t+1,t = xt+1 and letting yT
t = [zt,xt]T, (A.1) becomes
yt+1 = Ayt + Bwt (A.2)
Deﬁne target variables st by
st = Myt + Hwt (A.3)



















where Q = MTQ1M, U = MTQ1H, R = Q2 + HTQ1H, Q1 and Q2 are symmetric
and non-negative deﬁnite R is required to be positive deﬁnite and λ ∈ (0,1) is discount
factor. The procedures for evaluating the three policy rules are outlined in the rest of this
appendix (or Currie and Levine (1993) for a more detailed treatment).
A.1 The Optimal Policy: Cooperation with Commitment (CC)
Consider the policy-maker’s ex-ante optimal policy at t = 0. This is found by minimizing






t Qyt + 2yT
t Uwt + wT
t Rwt) +  t+1(Ayt + Bwt − yt+1) (A.6)
where  t is a row vector of costate variables. By standard Lagrange multiplier theory we
minimize




with respect to the arguments of L0 (except z0 which is given). Then at the optimum,
L0 = Ω0.
Redeﬁning a new costate vector pt = λ−1 T
t , the ﬁrst-order conditions lead to
wt = −R−1(λBTpt+1 + UTyt) (A.8)
λATpt+1 − pt = −(Qyt + Uwt) (A.9)
Substituting (A.8) into (A.2)) we arrive at the following system under control
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A − BR−1UT 0






To complete the solution we require 2n boundary conditions for (A.10). Specifying z0






λtpt = 0 (A.11)
34and the initial condition








is partitioned so that p1t is of dimension (n − m) × 1. Equation
(A.3), (A.8), (A.10) together with the 2n boundary conditions constitute the system under
optimal control.



























































partitioned so that S11 is (n − m) × (n − m) and S22 is m × m is the solution to the
steady-state Ricatti equation
S = Q − UF − FTUT + FTRF + λ(A − BF)TS(A − BF) (A.18)







where Zt = ztzT
t . To achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p20 = 0 at time t = 0. At
time t > 0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p2t = 0. It can be shown that
N22 < 0, so the incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory of the optimal
policy. This is the time-inconsistency problem.
A.2 Optimized Simple Rules (SIMCC and SIMNC)
We now consider simple sub-optimal rules of the form






35where D is constrained to be sparse in some speciﬁed way. Rule (A.20) can be quite
general. By augmenting the state vector in an appropriate way it can represent a PID
(proportional-integral-derivative)controller (though the paper is restricted to a simple pro-
portional controller only).









where P = Q+UD+DTUT +DTRD. The system under control (A.1), with wt given by
(A.20), has a rational expectations solution with xt = −Nzt where N = N(D). Hence
yT
t Pyt = zT
t Tzt (A.22)
where T = P11 − NTP21 − P12N + NTP22N, P is partitioned as for S in (A.17) onwards
and
zt+1 = (G11 − G12N)zt (A.23)
where G = A + BD is partitioned as for P. Solving (A.23) we have
zt = (G11 − G12N)tz0 (A.24)










where Zt = ztzT
t and V satisﬁes the Lyapunov equation
V = T + HTV H (A.26)
where H = G11 − G12N. At time t = 0 the optimized simple rule is then found by
minimizing Ω0 given by (A.25) with respect to the non-zero elements of D given z0 using
a standard numerical technique. An important feature of the result is that unlike the
previous solution the optimal value of D is not independent of z0. That is to say
D = D(z0)
For the non-cooperative case, in a closed-loop Nash equilibrium we assume each poli-
cymaker chooses rules wt = Dyt and w∗
t = D∗yt independently taking the rule of the other
bloc as given. The equilibrium is then computed by iterating between the two countries
until the solutions converge.
36A.3 The Stochastic Case

















where ut is an n × 1 vector of white noise disturbances independently distributed with
cov(ut) = Σ. Then, it can be shown that certainty equivalence applies to all the policy
rules apart from the simple rules (see Currie and Levine (1993)). The expected loss at
time t is as before with quadratic terms of the form zT
t Xzt = tr(Xzt,ZT

























where Et is the expectations operator with expectations formed at time t.

































The optimized cooperative simple rule is found at time t = 0 by minimizing ΩSIM
0









or, in other words, the optimized rule depends both on the initial displacement z0 and on
the covariance matrix of disturbances Σ. The non-cooperative rule for the stochastic case
follows as before.
A.4 Non-Cooperation with Commitment (NC)
In Liu and Pappa (2005) a NC regime with commitment is used which is open-loop in
character. For stochastic environments a closed-loop equilibrium is more appropriate.
Suppose country 1 assumes w∗
t = 0 (no control) or some other initial rule and calculates









p2t+1 = H21zt + H22p2t (A.33)



























































Now replace the initial rule of country 2 with (A.35) and recalculate wt for country 1.


















p2t is then up-dated with ˆ p2t and country 2 responds in a similar way. Iterating in this























provided the algorithm converges. The expected welfare losses in equilibrium are then
given by an expression analogous to (A.19) for both countries.
A.5 Cooperation with Discretion (CD)
As for CC we only give the outline solution. This is given by the iterative scheme
Jt = −(A22 + Nt+1A21)−1(Nt+1A11 + A21) (A.39)
Kt = −(A22 + Nt+1A21)−1(Nt+1B1 + B2) (A.40)
Nt = −Jt + KtFt (A.41)
Ft = (Rt + λB
T
t St+1Bt)(Ut + λB
T
t St+1At) (A.42)
Qt = Q11 + JT
t Q21 + Q12Jt + JT
t Q22Jt (A.43)
Ut = U1 + Q12Kt + JT
t U2 + JT
t Q22Jt (A.44)
Rt = R + KT
t Q22Kt + U2tKt + KT
t U2 (A.45)




t RtFt + λ(At − BtF)TSt+1(At − BtFt) (A.46)
where, to ease the notational burden, the subscript c has been dropped in Cc,Uc and Rc.
If these converge to stationary values J,K,N,F,Q,U,R and S then the solution is given
by
wt = −Fzt (A.47)
xt = −Nzt (A.48)
where
zt+1 = [A11 + A12J − (B1 + A12K)F]zt + ut (A.49)





t + Σ/(1 − λ))) (A.50)
A.6 Non-cooperative Equilibria with Discretion (ND)
Regime ND is a Nash equilibrium found by iterating between the two policy-makers to-
gether and the private sector in a Cournot-like adjustment process. For the case of two
countries acting independently we now have three players. There are a number of ways in
which the iteration may now proceed. The method we chose is to pass from country 1 to
the private sector to country 2 to the private sector and so on. Then given initial values
for D,D∗ and N, provided the iteration converges, we arrive at the ND equilibrium.
B Quadratic Approximation of Utility Function



















where we use the resource constraints rather than full set of constraints that involve price
setting. For the purposes of this paper we set the elasticity   between home and foreign
goods to 1, and also assume that home bias w is the same in each bloc. Inﬂation does
not enter any of the resource constraints, and it is easy to show that the second order
approximation involving inﬂation stems directly from (B.1), and is given by 1
2wπ(πH,t −
γH,tπH,t−1)2 where wπ =
ξζ
(1−βξ)(1−ξ) in (82) of the main text. The remaining terms of the
quadratic approximation are then obtained as the second-order expansion to the stationary


























+ λ2t(Zt − hCt−1) + λ3t(Yt − Uoil,t(wT1−w
t Ct + (1 − w)Tw
t C∗
t ) − Gt) (B.2)
+ λ4t(Y ∗
t − Uoil,t((1 − w)T−w
t Ct + wTw−1
t C∗





39In the ﬁrst order conditions we set G = gyY , and obtain the equilibrium value for the
Nash solution as in the main text. Other relevant steady state values for the second order
approximation are
C = (1 − gy)Y λ3 = κ
Y φ
A1+φ λ1 = λ3
2(1 − w)
2(1 − βh)(1 − w) + 2w−1
σ (1 − h)
λ4 = λ3
(1 − w)(2w(1 − βh) −
(2w−1)
σ (1 − h))
w(2(1 − βh)(1 − w) + 2w−1
σ (1 − h))
(B.4)
The second-order approximation (apart from the inﬂation contribution described above)
























σ2 (1 − h)λ1 + 2w
2w − 1
σ




+ C(λ3 − λ4)w(2w − 1)ctτt + C
2w − 1
σ







(1 − h)oiltct + 2w(1 − w)oiltτt − gyoiltgt)
















yt(uC,t + uL,t) (B.5)
For the cooperative case the problem is much simpler; the welfare function of course
includes welfare from both home and foreign blocs, and the risk-sharing condition is re-

































A1+φ[yt(uC,t + uL,t) + yt(u∗
C,t + u∗




Finally the steady state expressions for can be used to eliminate the unobservable
parameter κ and obtain the quadratic expressions (71) and (72) in the main text.
C Calibration
Our empirical US-Euro model will be estimated and calibrated without imposing sym-
metry on any parameters with the following exceptions. As we have noted ζ∗ = ζ. In
40addition, in order to formulate optimal cooperative policies we need to impose a com-
mon discount factor β = β∗. This also ensures that the zero-inﬂation steady state sees a
common nominal interest rate in the two blocs
The following fundamental parameters need to be estimated or calibrated:
1. Disturbances , ρa,ρ∗
a, ρg,ρ∗
g, ρe,ρ∗
e and corresponding standard deviations.
2. Preference Parameters h,h∗, σ,σ∗, β = β∗, φ,φ∗,  , ∗,
(Note: unidentiﬁed ζ∗ = ζ, are only needed later for the welfare analysis; ω,ω∗ are
derived below are not really needed.)
3. Bloc Size n, n∗, ν,ν∗ (Note n∗ = 1 − n, ν∗ = 1 − ν and n∗
n = ν∗
ν , so we only need
to calibrate n, the relative population size of the H-bloc.)
4. Pricing γH, ξH, γ∗
F, ξ∗
F
5. Labour Market Elasticities of Substitution η, η∗.
The remaining parameters to estimate are the bias parameters ω and ω∗. In principle
these can be treated as any other parameter. However we adopt an alternative procedure
is to use trade data so as to equate
PFCF
PTCT







= (1 − w∗) = import share of traded consumption in F bloc (C.8)
which calibrate w and w∗. We also need to calibrate: C
Y , C∗
Y ∗, and Y
Y ∗.
We now have the following derived parameters as functions of estimated or cali-
brated parameters
• αH = wC
Y
• αF = (1 − w∗)n∗C∗





F = w∗ C∗
Y ∗
• α∗
H = (1 − w) nC




Note if TB = 0 in the steady state (which we have assumed in the linearization
above), then Y = C + TB = C and Y ∗ = C∗, so C
Y = C∗
















n )=w if n = n∗
• ω∗ = w∗ n
n∗
1−w∗(1− n
n∗)=w∗ if n = n∗
From the linearization it is apparent that parameters β = β∗, ζ = ζ∗, η and η∗ are not
identiﬁed and are therefore calibrated along with w, w∗ and the relative bloc sizes.
In the results reported in the present version of the paper we assume symmetric blocs
with n = n∗ and all parameters identical. The oil shock is common, the technology shocks
can be correlated in principle, but not in these results. Other shocks are independent.
ρi = 0.7 for all shocks i = a,g etc, all standard deviations are 1%. There is no government
sector (cy = 1). φ = 1.7,   = 1, ξH = ξF = 2/3 corresponding to a 3-quarter Calvo price
contract, ζ = 7.674 corresponding to a 15% mark-up, h = 0.5, σ = 2, β = 0.99 and there
is no indexation. Import shares are assumed to be 25% so w = w∗ = 0.75.














































































































































































































Figure 1: Responses to a Negative Technology Shock: No ZLB Constraint Im-
posed.
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Figure 2: Cooperation with Commitment: Imposing the ZLB






























































Figure 3: Cooperation with Commitment: Imposing the ZLB






















Figure 4: Cooperation with Discretion: Imposing the ZLB



























































Figure 5: Cooperation with Discretion: Imposing the ZLB


















Figure 6: Non-Cooperation with Discretion: Imposing the ZLB

























Figure 7: Cooperation with a Commitment Current Inﬂation Rule: Imposing
the ZLB


























































Figure 8: Cooperation with a Commitment Current Inﬂation Rule: Imposing
the ZLB
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